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THE ROLE OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE WAR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
by Paul Mojzes1 
The starting point of this paper are two premises. The first is that war is the worst form 
human interaction. The second is that cooperation among people of diverse ch!lracteristics 
(such as race, religion, nationality, gender, etc.) is more important than national sovereignty, 
national Lebensraum, traditions, customs, historical boundaries, and so forth. If these 
premises are acceptable, then one may claim that the contribution of the religious 
communities2 to the outbreak of the present war in the former Yugoslavia is major while the 
contribution of the religious communities toward cessation of hostilities and reconciliation 
is minor. 
The focus of this paper will be exclusively on the contemporary situation because of my 
c~nviction that the historical overview has been offered ad naseum with no new light shed 
since each religious community has its own distinct version of history and because presently 
history is being mythologized in ever more bizarre and divergent directions, the distinct 
purpose of which is not to determine what happened in the past and interpret it for the 
present but to provide ammunition for one's claims in the present situation and recall 
grievances against other groups in the past so that one may avenge them in the present.3 
1This paper was originally written for a conference "Religion and Crisis in Eastern Europe After 
Communism" in Houston, TX, April 23-25, 1993. 
2The term 'religious communities' will be used here instead of the more customary term 
'churches' because the word church is unsuitable for Islam (as well as Judaism but the latter plays 
a negligible role in the present conflict). The term 'religious community• is used here in the sense 
of an organized institutional formation of adherents of a religious orientation, such as Serbian 
Orthodox, Macedonian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic. 
3 Among the more hilarious products of recent nationalistic 'historical' investigations is that the 
Croats originate in ancient Iran, that the Serbs originate in the Caucasus, and yet earlier in ancient 
Mesopotamia, that Islam came to the Balkans independently centuries prior to the Ottoman Turkish 
conquest or that the present Macedonians are somehow directly linked with Alexander the Great 
of Macedonia. 
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Likewise my own analysis of how this war broke out and what fuels it will be left out 
as I have addressed this elsewhere.'' I do not claim that the present war in ex-Yugoslavia 
began as a religious war, or is currently a primarily a religious war but it is my contention 
that the war has distinct ethno-religious characteristics as these two realities have become so 
enmeshed that they cannot be separated. 
The interaction of nationality5 and religion to the point of overlapping and identicalness 
is a well known phenomenon in much of Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. The 
Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and elsewhere tried to rupture this close identification for 
both good and bad reasons. A generation or two grew up under Tito, most of them believing 
that ethnic and religious distinctions were not unbridgeable and that virulent nationalism 
was laid to rest at the end of World War II. We now know that this was not so; ethno-
religious identification returned with a vengeance. Most of the readers may have discovered 
this after the Great Transformation in 1989, but it was discernible much earlier. Political 
scientists noticed that the phenomenon of 'national Communism' was a powerfully disruptive 
factor in the international Communist movement, and it was nurtured by many in the East 
and the West with the hope that it will erode Soviet hegemonism. This it did. But one 
wonders whether the results are not somewhat akin to nurturing Islamic fundamentalism as 
an antidote to Arab socialism or supporting Saddam Hussain as an antidote to Ayatollah 
Khomeini's Islamic revolution. In any case Communists were able to dispose neither of 
nationalism nor of religion despite having attempted both. As the Communist pterodaktyl 
perished and left the nest empty, the eggs hatched an entire flock of birds of pr·ey who are 
now viciously pecking at each other in the fight to dominate the entire nest or at least a 
segment of the nest. 
The large religious communities played a divisive role during the pre--Communist, the 
Communist, and the post-Communist period.6 Yugoslavia was divided not merely into three 
4See "Nationalism, Religion, and Peace in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Yugoslavia" 
in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe (hereafter OPREE) Vol. XI, No. 6 (December 
1991), pp. 12-31, and "War Between Religions," OPREE, Vol. XII, No.2 (March 1992), pp.i--vi, "The 
Reign of Ethnos: Who is to Blame in Yugoslavia?" in Christian Century (November 4, 1993), pp. 
996-999, and "Intervening in Bosnia" in Christian Century (April 14, 1993), pp. 388-390. 
51 prefer the use of the word ethnicity over nationality because some ethnic groups do not have 
a state of their own yet possess a yearning for self -governing and sovereignty and because [ believe 
that the nation-states of the former Yugoslavia are not nations in the modern sense but are somewhat 
akin to tribalism, i.e. that the claim of being a Serb or Croat is closer to the claim of being a Yoruba 
or an lbo than being a Swede or a Norwegian. 
6Professor Vjekoslav Bajsic, a Roman Catholic theologian who is teaching at the Roman Catholic 
Theological School in Zagreb, explained already in the late 1970s in an interview with this author 
that the 2!lly institution that was holding Yugoslavia together was the Yugoslav Communist Party· 
(and the army which was under its control) while the religious communities played centripetal roles. 
Thus when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia fell apart along the six national component parts, 
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communities: Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim but into smaller ethno-
religious units. The Roman Catholic Church of Slovenia reinforced Slovenian nationalism, 
Roman Catholic Church u Hrvata7 supported Croatian nationalism,8 the Serbian Orthodox 
Church supported the idea of Serbdom among Serbs and Montenegrins and tried even to 
incorporate the Macedonians, the 'schismatic' autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church 
contributed to the strengthening of Macedonian national awareness, and Islam contributed 
to the affirmations of Slavic Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and adjacent areas (e.g. 
Sandzhak) and Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Orthodox ecclesiology 
provides for the formation of national churches but Catholic and Islamic ecclesiology eschews 
·such approaches. So for theologiCal, political, and national reasons Roman Catholic leaders 
would frequently use the vague term "our" Church but a closer examination would reveal that 
"our" was quite limited to their own national unit. Likewise Bosnian and Albanian Muslims 
had little interaction with one another.9 The Roman Catholics of Slovenia perceive 
themselves having a quite separate religious dynamic of interaction with their nation than the 
Catholic Church among Croats and vice versa. If Roman Catholic ecclesiology allowed it 
these churches would in no time call themselves Slovenian Catholic Church and Croatian 
Catholic Church.10 
To put it bluntly the leaders of each religious community enthusiastically and uncritically 
supported the continuous inflation of nationalism of their respective membership and 
frequently attacked the others for allegedly being even more uncritically nationalistic then 
·· they were. This is analogous to a blind person calling a deaf-mute handicapped! 
th~re _was no longer·a force that could hold the country together. 
7 An awkward linguistic term even in Croatian which transliterates even more awkwardly into 
English: "in Croats," but could be more freely translated "of Croats" or· "among Croats." 
8This I know from personal experience as I interviewed prominent Roman Catholic theologians 
in Slovenia and Croatia who were members of the same Bishops Conference but did not know even 
rudimentary data about each other's life while being able to provide detailed analysis of the situation 
of their church among their nationals. Another illustration of the ethno-religious separatisms is the 
case of a village which in the Zagreb Archdiocese which had a overwhelmingly Slovene population 
and was served by a Croat priest. This priest caused great distress among the villagers as only one 
of the about twenty masses celebrated per week was in the Slovene language despite the repeated 
petitions of his parishioners. They finally requested transfer of their village into the Ljubljana 
archdiocese. This took place as recently as 1991/92. 
91 found in 1969 that the Supreme Islamic headquarters in Sarajevo were quite uninformed and 
uninterested in Islam among Albanians. 
101llustrative of this nationalistic character of religion is the unhappiness among Croats over the 
decision of the Vatican to separate the Bishops Conference of Croatia from the Bishops Conference 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina--both of whom are Croatian, though no regret was shown over the split 
of the Slovenian Bishops' conference. 
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Most of the religious communities contribute to the sacralization of their respective 
nationalities, and religion plays the role of a political ideology. As Ivan Cvitkovic remarked, 
"the greater the participation in religious activities in a region, the greater the tendency 
toward national homogenisation and separatism."11 Let us now look at several specific cases. 
A. Contribution of Religious Communities toward Hatred and War 
1. Roman Catholic Contribution to Nationalism12 
Recently two Roman Catholic authors, Geert van Dartet13 and Jure Kristo, 14 as well as 
Anne Herbst16 have claimed that the Roman Catholic Church, unlike the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, does not claim that Croat equals Catholic and has a more reconciling, ecumenical 
posture toward S~rbians. This is simply erroneous and, indeed, can be disproved by the very 
data that Jure Kristo provides in support of his own contention. 
Josip Beljail in Veritas16 writes about the role of the Pope and the Holy See. He declares 
that they in an unprecedented act became the amplifier of Croatian independence and 
11Ivan Cvitkovic, "God is Dead," in Breakdown: War & Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (London: 
Yugofax, 1992), p. 52. 
12I will zero in on the Roman Catholic Church among Croats [Katolicka crkva u Hrvata or 
frequently simply Crkva u Hrvata] because I have more data on it and because there is a war in 
Croatia. 
18Geert van Dartel, "The Nations and the Churches in Yugoslavia," Religion. State. and Society, 
Vol. 20, Nos. 3 & 4 (1992), pp. 275-288. Geert van Dartel is a Roman Catholic priest from Holland 
who studied in Zagreb under the late Josip Turcinovic, one of the most liberal Catholic priests who 
was rather exceptional in his ecumenical stance, and van Dartel mistakenly ascribes it to the entire 
Roman Catholic Church in Croatia. See also his article "Nikolaj Velimirovic (1880-1956)," Glaube 
in der 2. Welt, Vol. 21, No.4 (April 1993), pp. 20-26 which is fundamentally sound yet does display 
an anti-Serbian Orthodox bias because he tends to ascribe unique enthno-religious bonding among 
Serbian theologians, when in fact, this characteristics was far more widely disseminated, especially 
among emigre theologians. 
14Jure Kristo, "The Catholic Church in Times of Crisis" and "Diverse Functions of Catholicism 
and Orthodoxy in Social Upheavals (1989-1992)" unpublished manuscripts. 
16 Anne Herbst, "Tod und VerkHtrung: Die Orthodoxe und die Katholische Kirche im 
siidslawischen Konflikt," Glaube in der 2. Welt, Vol. 21, No.4 (April 1993), pp. 14-18. 
16Josip Beljan, "Priznata vjernost," [Recognition of Faithfulness} Veritas (Zagreb), Nos. 9-10, 
(September-October, 1992), pp. 24-25. Veritas is a popular Catholic dedicated to St. Anthony of 
Padua. 
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sovereignty as a reward to the Croatian people on account of thirteen centuries of their 
loyalty to Rome. 
God has by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked at his faithful 
people, spoke out on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle, 
warring together with his people ·fnr their liberation . . . With this war God also 
returned to his people, in its heart and home. [God] Returned to the entire mass 
media, political, social, and state life of Croatia, from where he was driven out 45 
years earlier. The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, Croatian bishop 
next to Croatian minister of state. Croatian priest and teacher are again together in 
the school. Present at ·masses in churches are officers and Croatian soldiers. 
Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks .... This was truly again a real war for 
"the honored cross and golden liberty," for the return of Christ and liberty to Croatia. 
The Church is glad.for the return of its people "from the twofold" slavery-
-Serbian and Communist. This is a great "kairos" of God's grace for the entire 
Croatian people.17 
He continues: 
Here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian land but a war 
between good and evil, Christianity and Communism, culture and barbarity, 
civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred. . . . Thank 
God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics.18 
Another example was an interview carried out by Darko Pavicic, a journalist of the 
formerly independent Danas with Franjo Cardinal Kuharic over a gun-toting Franciscan 
chaplain, Fra Duka, who was accompanying Croatian troops into battle and who accepted a 
political office. To the question of whether he condemns such activity, Cardinal Kuharic 
wove a lengthy answer saying that ideally chaplains ought not to go into battle but "when 
pater Duka wears a uniform and carries a revolver he is not doing this as a representative of 
the Church but it is his private matter.1119 Since the head of the Franciscan order, in whose 
jurisdiction this friar belongs, did not condemn him neither will the Cardinal, though he 
would prefer to see him out of uniform. The conclusion that can be drawn from the 
Cardinal's response is that such action is permissible and at least will go unpunished by the 
church authorities. And, indeed, many priests and seminarians have fought in battles. 20 
Jure Kristo characterizes leadership of Cardinal Kuharic as skillfully steering the 
Croatian people to sovereignty. He states for instance that in the late 1980s: 
17Ibid., p. 24. Translated from Croatian into English by Paul Mojzes. 
18Ibid., p. 25. 
19Darko Pavicic', "Svecenik nije komesar," [A Priest is not a Commissar] Danas, Vol. 10, No. 503 
(October 8, 1991), p. 28. 
20Marko Or!olic, a professor at the Franciscan Theological Seminary in Sarajevo told me that 
most of his former students are armed with machine guns defending the city. 
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Unlike his communist compatriots, [sic] cardinal [Kuharic] was not timid about the 
defence of national sovereignty. Catholic bishops were convinced that by defending 
Croatian sovereignty they were doing something good. Hence, they used every 
opportunity to stand in defence of Croat national interests. One such opportunity was 
the debate about constitutional amendments concerning the name of [sic] official 
language in Socialist Republic of Croatia. 21 
They pressed the exclusive use of the Croatian literary language rather than Croato-Serbian 
or Serbo-Croatian. Apparently the bishops and other Catholic leaders did not take into 
account that this would be threatening to the Serbian population in Croatia who would 
naturally interpret it as the denial of their cultural rights and the right to use their 
language. 22 Did the Catholic bishops lack the wisdom to promote the rights of the Croatian 
people in such a way as not to threaten minority populations? Did they not act anti-
constitutionally in their advocacy of a move that would tear apart the federal structure and 
provoke a war? Surely they must have known many precedents where civil wars broke out 
over the preservation of a federation. Krista proceeds to point out other, at that time still 
unconstitutional, initiatives of the Catholic bishops. Namely as soon as they succeeded in 
their aim of unseating the Communist Party of Croatia and replacing it with the Croatian 
Democratic Union or Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica-:-HDZ (which Krista calls a national 
movement rather than a political party--which, indeed, is how the HDZ wishes to be 
represented in order to obtain near monopoly over Croatia), they switched attention to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. There they supported the political activity of the HDZ among Croats in 
blatant contradiction of the existing law which forbade the creation of political parties on 
exclusively national or religious basis. Wrote Krista, "Hence, the Catholic Church made 
offers to strike that provision from the books. At the same time, the faithful were 
encouraged not to fear organizing themselves on the national and religious basis."23 Indeed 
they and other nationalists prevailed. Exclusively national-religious parties were created by 
all,..-Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. These parties soon became the three major parties of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Those who know the national and religious problems of that state know 
how fragile the balance of the ingredients was and that the QD!y non-violent alternative was 
for a government that could somehow keep all three national-religious groups working 
21Jure Krista, "Diverse Functions of Catholicism ·and Orthodoxy in Social Upheavals (1989-
1992)" pp. 7-8. 
22This would later be aggravated after the victory of the Croatian Democratic Union by the 
immediate removal of signs that were both in the Latinic and Cyrillic script which in an 
· economically weak country is an expensive move which could only be interpreted by the Serbians 
as a decision to obliterate evidence of Serbian presence from Croatia (one should note that in Serbia 
to this day signs and newspapers appear in both alphabets) . 
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together in a secular context. Thus it is clear that the Roman Catholic bishops initiated the 
process of national-religious confrontation, one would guess not out of religious but out of 
nationalist motives, because they clearly equate the two. The outcome of that political move 
is nothing short of catastrophic, and t-he .Roman Catholic leadership bears a considerable 
responsibility for the ensuing tragedy. It does not take great wisdom to see that their 
initiatives in this complex area could only lead to war. The Communists, it seems in 
retrospect, were far more realistic about ~he national-religious threat than the Roman 
Catholic and Croatian leadership. 
Another manner in which the Roman Catholic leadership contributed to the tension in 
Yugoslavia was their support of'the Albanian cause in the Kosovo. This they did ostensibly 
in the name of human rights. It is true that the human rights of Albanians in Kosovo were 
severely curtailed by the bloody politics of repression on part of Milosevic's regi~e and that 
no decent human being could be silent on this issue, but the leadership of the Roman 
Catholic Church was not evenhanded and did not speak out on behalf of other repressed 
minorities (especially not of minority rights on the territory of Croatia). Their speaking out 
about the Kosovo situation was bound to aggravate the Serbians who do have some legitimate 
grievances about the fate of Serbs on Kosovo, though they pressed their interests in a very 
brutal and unacceptable manner. The Serbs would naturally interpret these appeals as an 
anti-Serb and anti-Orthodox move by the Roman Catholic Church. 24 
When the first free elections in Croatia yielded the victory of the HDZ and the Roman 
Catholic Church was finally publicly rehabilitated after years of oppression, the Catholic 
Church at first seemed to display practically unlimited support of the new regime's super-
patriotic Croatianism. The church leadership was present at the opening of the Sabor 
(Parliament) sessions; politicians and clergy did not fail to use picture opportunities in order 
to be seen together in the media, and much was done to reinforce the notion of the unity of 
the church, nation, and state. 26 Also the church leadership vigorously promoted the cult 
of Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, a controversial figure. Insofar as the Catholic leadership 
rejected the labeling of the entire Croatian people by some Serbian extremists as genocidal 
and indicated that Stepinac was badly treated by the Communists, they were right, but they 
showed too little willingness to express regret for the massacres against Serbians in World War 
241 use the word 'naturally' because of the Serb memory of Croat/Catholic massacres and 
persecutions in World War II, which, of course, are not forgotten and which give rise to fears that 
they could be repeated. 
26Cardinal Kuharic' felt the need to explain that he is keeping a distance .. between the Church and 
the government despite apparent linkages in his interview to Marinko Culic, "Nismo u narucju 
vlasti" [We are not in the Arms of the Government], .I!ru!M, Vol. 9, No. 461 (December 18, 1990), 
pp. 20-23. 
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II in which a number of clergy were directly involved and for which Stepinac had a certain 
culpability. Geert van Dartel and Anne Herbst mention that Bishop Pihler in 1963 did issue 
an apology asking Serbians for forgiveness26--one apology by a single Croat bishop in 1963 
for the massacre of anywhere from 50,000-700,000 Serbs!27 During the tense times prior to 
the outbreak of the war Serbian bishops often pleaded with the Roman Catholic colleagues 
to issue a more emphatic statement of regret and condemnation of the war crimes by Croats 
over Serbs in WWII, but more often than not Catholic bishops reacted by minimizing the 
casualties and responding with counter complaints that many Croats were killed after the War 
by the Partisans.28 This too, of course, would have been interpreted by the Serbians as a 
threat as they wondered whether the Croatians are planning ethnic cleansing as they did in 
World War II. 
Did the Roman Catholic Church of Croatia contribute to the outbreak of the war in a 
nationalist manner? I would answer that with an emphatic yes. The Church leadership 
(some more than others) together with Franjo Tudjman made provocative and foolish moves. 
They pushed their agenda much too speedily with no regard to the consequences of their 
behavior and certainly have to be seen as being among the culprits for the war. 
2. Serbian Orthodox Role In the Disintearation of Yuaoslavia 
Since the Serbs had far more vested interest in keeping Yugoslavia together than the other 
nationalities, it may seem odd that the Serbian Orthodox Church contributed to the outbreak 
of hostilities, but they did. They did so by their role in the Kosovo conflict, in whipping up 
the claims of the uniqueness of Serbian victimization by others, and later in their uncritical 
support of Serbian nationalist aspirations. 
26Van Dartel, op. cit., p. 286 and Herbst, op. cit., p. 16. 
27This is not the place to discuss the numbers of massacred which the Croats tend to diminish 
and the Serbs to exaggerate. Even if it were only a thousand of massacred Serbs would it not be 
appropriate for the entire Bishop's Conference to issue a statement of regret? After all there were 
numerous attempts of forcible conversion of Orthodox to Catholicism and such an act is ecclesiastical. 
28The Austrian Catholic theologian, Dr. Philipp Harnoncourt, provided information in January 
1993 to this author that he personally heard at a meeting in Vienna convened by Cardinal K<>ning 
to work on reconciling the two churches, a plea by the Orthodox Bishop Irinej of Novi Sad and 
Backa that the Roman Catholic Bishops could do much to allay Serbian fears by condemning the 
destruction of 500,000 Serbs during World War II, However the Catholic Bishop Djuro Koksa 
immediately countered that the charge is exaggerated--there were only 50,000 killed, he claimed-
-and then did not proceed to apologize even for that number. This author likewise never heard a 
Croatian Roman Catholic priest make any statement that could be considered as a condemnation of 
the atrocities of the past war. 
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Already in the late 1970s the Serbian Orthodox Church started warning about the 
Albanian 'menace' in Kosovo. 29 The population explosion of the Albanians and the exodus 
of the Serbs was labeled in a hyperbole as genocide of Serbs. Before too long this claim 
was generalized into the claim that the .Serbs in general are threatened on all sides by 
conspiracies.30 As the Yugoslav government cracked down on Albanian demonstrations and 
repeatedly repressed dissent concerns were evoked by non-Serbs about violations of the rights 
of the Albanians, the Serbian Orthodox C~urch went on a propaganda counter attack by 
issuing appeals regarding alleged rapes, murders, expulsions, and destructions of Serbian 
cultural monuments and sacred sites--in other words "ethnic cleansing"--by Albanians.31 
This strengthened the Serb resolve not to give up Kosovo and produced powerful anti-
Albanian dislike among Serbs. 
Another nationalist conflict by the SOC was the Serbian Orthodox Church's: strenuous 
opposition to the autonomy of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The Patriarch of Belgrade 
claimed jurisdiction over nearly all Orthodox Churches in Yugoslavia, namely Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. Already at that point it became obvious that Serbian Orthodox 
Church leaders and Serbian Communist leaders saw eye to eye on the Macedonian 
questions, 32 just as the Macedonian Orthodox Church hierarchy saw eye top eye with the 
Macedonian Communists. Tension also arose in the Orthodox Church in Montenegro where 
a pro-Serbian branch negated the separateness of the Montenegrins, and a pro-Montenegrin 
branch asserted that the Montenegrins ought to insist on the autonomy of their church, as it 
was in the past. These two groups occasionally came to literal blows. Neither of these two 
conflicts are yet resolved. 
As it became evide~t that Yugoslavia was heading toward disintegration after Tito's death 
Serbs perceived a threat to their national interests. The leading role in this crisis was played 
not by the Church but by the scholars of the Serbian Academy of Sciences (SANU for Srpska 
Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti) who issued a Memorandum in 1986. In· that document that 
2~he province is a Serbian national shrine on account of having been the center of the medieval 
Serbian kingdom and the site of the fateful Kosovo Field battle in 1389 as well as the location of the 
first Serbian Patriarchate in Pee. 
30To the contrary the Serbs were the largest of the national groups in Yugoslavia and were 
dominant in the federal army and bureaucracy. 
31E.g "Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian orthodox Church Against the Genocide Inflicted 
by the Albanians on the Indigenous Serbian Population, Together with the Sacrilege of their Cultural 
Monuments in their own Country," (Photostated typescript signed by five Serbian Orthodox bishops 
of Western countries, September 14, 1988.) 
32Marinko Culic, "Zaruke zvijezde i krsta," [The Engagement of the Star and the Cross], Danas, 
Vol. 9, No.436, (May 26, 1990), pp. 28-29. 
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Serbian academics countered the charge that ·Serbians dominated all other nationalities in 
Yugoslavia and pictured reality in reverse, namely that the Serbs suffered most for the sake 
of Yugoslavi~ but were the greatest losers and most heavily victimized by the Communist 
system and Tito's government. It was charged that the inter-republican borders were 
established unilaterally by Tito, a Croat, with no reference to demographic factors in order 
to weaken and damage Serbia. The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 was blamedfor weakening 
the Serbs, and a great constitutional conflict took place with the Serbs wanting to change that 
constitution while the other nationalities wanted to uphold the constitutional provisions of 
the 1974. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church soon vigorously joined SANU in vo1cmg Serbian 
grievances, in particular incensed by what they regarded as the lack of Croatian Catholic 
willingness to atone for their war-time crimes against the Serbian Orthodox population in 
Croatia and Bosnia. Prominent Serbian Orthodox bishops and theologians started vigorously 
speaking up on behalf of what they considered threatened Serbdom in areas where in World 
War II massacres of Serbs took place, in particular the concentration camp of Jasenovac in 
Croatia. It was lamented that no Roman Catholic official came to the commemorations to 
the victims of Croatian fascist 'ethnic cleansing' during the dedication of the Serbian 
. Orthodox Church in Jasenovac.33 Cries of "never again" could be heard from both nationalist 
and church circles. The Serbian Orthodox Church kept reiterating its age-old claim that the 
Church always was, is, and will be, even when all others fail, the defender of Serbian 
national interests. The gravest threats to Serbdom and Orthodoxy, the hierarchs pointed out, 
were Muslims and Cathoiics. The crimes of the Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (abbreviated to 
NDH and standing for Independent State of Croatia) and the ustashe (Nazi Croatian crack 
units similar to the SS) were frequently linked to the Roman Catholic Church and its 
leadership.3' The Serbian Orthodox fully sided with other Serb nationalists who saw in the 
Croatian independence movement many "ustashoid" elements. 36 
33This author does believe that it was the real aim of Pavelic's regime to have a pure Croatian 
"Great Croatia." I am stressing that in order to point out that the Serb attempts at "ethnic cleaning," 
which I under no circumstances support, are in fact retribution for what happened in World War II . 
(namely we are witnessing the ending of that war on the Balkans as well as the beginning of the next 
round of warfare). The Serbs are carrying out what is popularly known a5 milo za drago or tit for 
tat. 
s• Among the Serbian publications emphasizing the tie between Croatian nationalism and Roman 
Catholicism were Dragoljub Zivojinovic' and Dejan Lucie, varvarstvo y ime Hristovo [Barbarian,ism 
in Christ's Name] (1988), Vladimir Dedijer, Yatikan i Jasenovac (The Vatican and Jasenovac) and . 
Milan Buhijic, UstaSki zloCini genocida [Ustasa Crimes of Genocide], 1988. 
36It seeins, inde~d, that too little care was given by the nascent Croatian independence movement 




By the late 1980s the anti-Albanian, anti-Slovene, and anti-Croat feelings were conflated, 
and the Serbian Orthodox Church saw initially in Slobodan Milosevic's "antibureaucratic 
revolution" the salvation and liberation of the Serbian people. Only in 1992 did some 
Orthodox leaders, especially Patriarch Paull, see Milosevic's populism as a threat to the well-
being of the Serbian people. Patriarch Paul I and several other prelates openly criticized the 
government of Milosevic at anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade and elsewhere and 
charged that the government is harming the interests of the Serbian people. 
Jure Kristo and Anne Herbst demonize the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church for 
allegedly always supporting the state in contrast to what they perceives as the much more 
independent role of the Catholic Church among Croatians. Both of them are too harsh on 
the Orthodox Church prelates and theologians and too lenient with the Catholic ones. No 
significant difference in the relationship of these two churches toward their respecHve nation 
is in evidence. It is true that the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy was more servile to the former 
Yugoslav government than the Roman Catholic hierarchy was, but there are a host of other 
plausible explanations for that. In respect to the rise of national chauvinism both churches 
contributed heavily. It is symptomatic that parallel to the notion Crkva u Hrvata is its match 
Srpska crkva as a synonym for the Orthodox Church. The term Serbian seems to carry more 
weight that the term Orthodox. An interesting editorial in Teoloski Pogledi [Theological 
Views), the official theological journal of the SOC indicates that there are those who 
mistakenly favored only the Serbian national identity as a measure of their adherence to the 
Christian church and that in the period of the decline of Communism some people started 
identifying the church with the state, blaming the SOC for the errors of government policies 
and claiming that this brought about God's wrath upon both the Serbian church and state. 
But Dr. Ignjatije Midic, the author of the editorial, rejects this equation.36 Yet in typical 
Orthodox fashion he rejects a sharp division of the worldly (political) and spiritual 
(ecclesiastic) domains. 37 
The SOC Metropolitan of Sarajevo, Nikolaj Mrdja, was the first Serb leader to point out 
that organized rapes were being carried out by Serbian extremists. However for Christmas 
1992 the SOC hierarchy issued a sharp statement categorically denying that Serbs have 
organized rapes and challenging anyone to name a single concentration camp where such 
rapes occurred~ while simultaneously charging that many Serbian women had been raped by 
36Ignjatije Midic, "Umesto uvodnika," [Instead of an Introduction], TeoloSki Pogledi [Belgrade], 
Vol. XXIII, Nos. 1-4, 1991, p. 12. 
37 • . lbtd., p. 15. 
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Muslims and Croats.88 This case indicates the delicate position of the SOC, namely to 
truthfully point out events that it cannot conceivably condone and the need to become the 
protector of the national reputation when the entire Serbian nation is demonized by the 
outside world. 
Like the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia the Serbian Orthodox Church favors 
obligatory religious education in schools.89 Unlike the Croatian Sabor the Assembly 
[Skupstina] of the rump Yugoslavia defeated the motion with a large majority. The SOC 
worries about the situation of Serbian children being catechized by Roman Catholic teachers 
in Croatian schools but seems unconcerned about the fate of non-Orthodox children in the 
.event of mandatory Orthodox catechism in schools of Serbia. Serb theologians also undertook 
the. defence of Serbs and attack of Croats (and others) when Croatian views critical of Serbs 
appear in foreign journals.40 
Neither Orthodox ecclesiology nor Serb nationalism is at ease . with a theology and 
patriotism of repentance and sharp criticism of one's own group. To that degree the 
criticisms of Herbst, Kristo, and van Dartel are accurate. They fail to see the same failings 
in Catholic ecclesiology and Croat nationalism which likewise has difficulty admitting 
wrongdoing by their own people. Failings are usually pointed out by the rivals and outsiders; 
·the power of internal criticism is left unused .. 
3. Bosnian Muslims: Ethno-Religious Ambiguity 
The Bosnian Muslims are in the unique and somewhat awkward position of being the 
only group of Muslim believers in the world who are also considered Muslim by nationality. 
Some claim that national consciousness among the Slavic Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
came late. Others maintain that the Muslims were the mainstream of Bosnian life, having 
come peacefully to Bosnia in the 9th Century and having created a Muslim civilization, 
culture, language, script, and so forth. 41 However most scholars contend that Christians of 
the former Bosnian Church underwent a mass conversion to Islam in 1436 and later in other 
38Glasnik [Belgrade], Vol. 73, No. 12 (December 1992), p. 201. Also "Noch einmal: Mos1em-
Frauen," Glaube in der 2. Welt, Vol. 21, No.2 (February 1993), pp. 10-11. Se also "Gewalt gegen 
Frauen als Mittel der Kriegsfiihrung," G2W, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January, 1993), pp. 16-19. 
39Lazar Milin, "Omladina i religija (pitanje veronauke u skolama)" [Youth and Religion (the 
question of catechism in schools)], Glasnik, Vol. 73, No.8 (August 1992), pp. 133-142. 
40Lazar Milin, "Srbi u ocima hrvatskog knjizevnika Vlade Gotovca," [The Serbs in the eyes of the 
Croatian writer Vlada Gotovac], Glasnik, Vol. 73, No. 5 (May 1992), pp. 85-89. 
41Statement by Smail Balic at the international Jewish-Christian-Muslim dialogue in Graz, 
Austria, January 4, 1993. 
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adjacent areas. ·U One thing is certain: the contemporary Slavic Muslims do not remember 
their pre-Islamic religious or ethnic origin. Since they were the ruling class during the rule 
of the Ottomans, they were detested by their neighboring Slavic Christians, Orthodox and 
Catholics alike. When the Turks withdrew from the Balkan peninsula, the so-called poturice 
[Turkicized people] were expected to return to their Christian origins thereby swelling the 
ranks of the Orthodox and/or Catholics. When the courting of the Muslims turned out to be 
unsuccessful, their Christian population continued their resentment and the Muslims had to 
work on their own identity. Some preferred to call themselves Yugoslavs, some Bosnjaks 
others Muslims. The Croats and the Serbs vigorously continued to claim that all the Muslims 
were converts from their respective religion and nationality. It is most likely that in fact 
both Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholics converted and in any case repressed their 
previous identities so effectively that most of them are unable to regard themselves one or 
the other. 43 
I am not informed first-hand about the engagement of Muslim religious leaders 
enhancing Muslim nationalism in Bosnia. My own personal travels through the region and 
the general opinion of observers is that Islam is more a cultural than religious identity for 
most Muslims in Yugoslavia and that they may well be one of the most secularized Muslims 
in the world, gravitating toward Europe rather than the Muslim world. It is said that the 
current President of the Bosnian government, Alija Izetbegovic, at the time when he was a 
Communist prisoner wrote a book that some describe as Islamic fundamentalist because 
allegedly he aimed to establish Bosnia as an Islamic state in which the Muslim majority would 
take over and rule with the help of the shariyat law.44 It is evident, however, that since he 
was elected to a responsible government post, he has consistently pledged himself to a 
secular, multi-national and multi-religious state in which everyone's rights would be 
respected. 
42Vatro Murvar, Nation and Religion in Central Europe and the Western Balkans--The Muslims 
in Bosnia. Hercegovina and Sandzak: A Sociological Analysis. (Brookfield, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 12. This author regards many of the speculations and hypotheses of 
Murvar and Batie as far-fetched, just as he is unimpressed by Serbian and Croatian mythological 
history. 
43Professor Esad Cimic, a former Marxist sociologist of religion of Muslim heritage caused quite 
a controversy when he rejected the innovation created during the later years of Tito's regime to call 
muslims Muslims, by joking that he thinks of himself as a Croat and his brother believes himself to 
be a Serb. 
44Since I did not read any of his writings, I cannot substantiate this claim, but Serbs frequently 
refer to the alleged fundamentalims of Izetbegovic. Croats on the other hand criticize him for having 
been too naive and trusting the Serbs and not arming the Bosnian Muslims in time, thus causing them 
to suffer disproportionate war casualties. 
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It is also evident that since the Western world has not given any effective assistance to 
the Muslims who are the major losers thus far in the war in former Yugoslavia, that 
eventually these Slavic Muslims may be driven into the arms of Islamic fundamentalists who 
seem more eager to assist them than others. If this takes place it will be less a conscious and 
free decision of the Bosnian Muslims and more an act of a desperate people on the verge of 
extermination. The battles between Muslim and Croat forces that broke out in late 1992 and 
April and May of 1993 are an evidence that the Muslim-Croat alliance is temporary, driven 
only by a common hatred of the Serbs. 
4. Macedonian Orthodox Separatism 
It is general knowledge that the Macedonian Orthodox Church was supported in its 
schism from the Serbian Orthodox Church by Tito's government in order to make a more 
determined effort to prove the separateness and identity of a Macedonian nationality.46 Since 
in Eastern Europe one cannot imagine a nationality without its own religion, it was important 
to establish an autocephalous or at least autonomous Macedonian church. This was done to 
deter Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian claims that Macedonians are not separate but are parts 
of their nationhood. Though one of the last nations in Europe to become free of Turkish 
overlordship (1913) and one of the last ethnic groups to proclaim its own national 
consciousness,46 the Macedonians in turn have made some outrageous claims about uniting 
Greek, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav Macedonia into a Great Macedonia, a move which has cost 
them especially Greek resistance to recognition as an independent, sovereign state upon the 
fall of Yugoslavia. 47 
Macedonian Orthodox higher clergy have dutifully carried out the task of promoting 
Macedonian sovereignty and been fairly effective ambassadors abroad. It is interesting that 
the Macedonian Orthodox hierarchs have nurtured fairly good relationships with the Vatican 
and the Croatian Catholics--one presumes on the old European principle of being friends 
with the enemies of your enemy. There seems to be a minor reconciliation with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church since no Orthodox Church in the world was willing to grant autocephaly 
to the MOC, and some accommodation will have to be worked out with the SOC which has 
very reluctantly granted it autonomy under the domain of the Serbian Patriarchate. 
46This is another area which the author did not research but is part of general knowledge. 
46Institut za Nacionalna Istorija, Istorija na Makedonskiot Narod (Skopje: NIP "Nova 
Makedonija," 1969. 3 vols. 
47See a map distributed by Macedonian Review (Skopje), Vol. 22 (1992). 
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S. Protestants; Inability to Withstand War Pronaganda 
The Protestants, being less than I% of the population are quite marginalized. Generally 
the larger churches tended to be chut:c~es. _of national minorities (Hungarians, Slovaks, 
Germans). Among the larger Yugoslav nationalities the number of Protestants was quite 
insignificant and played only a marginal role. 
In the past the free church Protestants, who tended to attract membership from a variety 
of national groups (e.g. Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, Methodists) tended 
to nurture exemplary harmonious relationships between the members of various nationalities, 
and there was hope that these 'gOOd relationships could survive the war. They were also 
outspoken in maintaining that God is not a nationalist and that religion ought to reconcile 
rather than divide people.48 
But that would have been too good to be true. These formerly unified churches that 
worked together wherever they had members on the territory of Yugoslavia now found 
themselves in separate countries and had to break up along the new nation-state borders 
into separate church organizations. 
Then many of the Protestant leaders in Croatia became so morally outraged at what they 
perceived, along with the rest of the Croatian people, as Serbian aggression that they 
condemned this aggression and urged foreign military intervention against Serbians, often 
criticizing foreigners, especially Americans, for inaction.49 This incensed their fellow-
religionists in other states and formerly close colleagues now regard them no longer as peace-
makers but war-mongers.60 
On the whole the Protestant communities tend to accept the official propaganda of their 
respective new states and often interpret the events the way such propaganda channels them. 
This does not mean that they uncritically support all the policies of their governments, but 
it does show that even they are unable to bridge the enormous abyss. that now separates 
Croats and Serbs, Serbs and Macedonians, etc. 
48Marijana Radulovic interviewing Peter Kuzmic, "Bogje zbunjen," (God is Perplexed] Danas, 
Vol. 10, No.465 (January 15, 1991), pp. 66-68. Kuzmic, widely regarded as the best known 
Protestant (Evangelical Pentecostal) theologian in Yugoslavia, is a Slovenian who lived and worked 
in Croatia and Serbia. 
49Peter Kuzmic, "U zamci medija i interesa," [In the Snare of Media and Interests] (Photocopy 
of an article in Izvori (Osijek) taken from Glas Slavonije (Osijek) but no date provided (probably 
1992). Pp. 8-10. 
60See Bill Yoder, "Protestant Adjustments After the Break-up of Yugoslavia," is this issue of 
Religion in Eastern Europe. 
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All Protestant churches have immersed themselves, despite their small size, into relief 
work, assisting both international religious relief agencies as well as out of their own means. 
Particularly impressive is the work of the Seventh-Day Adventists who at considerable 
personal risks to themselves deliver mail and packages to war ravaged areas where no postal 
system functions any longer.51 
B. The Reconciling Role of Religious Communities 
We already noted that the reconciling role of the religious communities is undeveloped 
in comparison to the divisive role. Calfs for peace and reconciliation are not lacking but many 
of them did not go beyond platitudes and claims that this or that religion has always stood 
for peace. Frequently the call for peace was tempered by strong defensive language rejecting 
culpability of one's own side and blame directed toward the other groups. Very few positive 
statements have been uttered about other religions and nationalities during these times, which 
is not surprising given the cruel treatment meted out to each other. 
Of course most people in the churches regret the war (though not all mourn the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia). Fewer members of the religious communities can give a sound 
assessment of the situation that is not merely a reflection of what they hear from their mass 
media. 52 These assessments rarely receive wide circulation. And even fewer are those who 
decide to become activists on behalf of peace. Most people see themselves as being victims 
of forces far too great for their modest abilities. Survival in tumultuous times is the 
overwhelming desire--active peace-making is neither a tradition nor do people have enough 
psychic energy left for conflict-resolution. Most are too shell-shocked by the brutality of 
the war and the troubled times for their communities and their own person to be able to stem 
the confrontational mood throughout the country. 
Several remarkable statements have been made, however, by leaders · of religious 
communities, both by themselves and in meeting with others. The most significant such 
occasions were the meetings between Patriarch Paul I of SOC with the head of the RCC 
Bishop's Conference Franjo Cardinal Kuharic. Their first meeting was in Sremski Karlovci 
(Serbia) in May 1991, the second in Slavonski Brod (Croatia) in August 1991, the third one 
in the Spring of I 992 in St. Gallen, Switzerland, the fourth in Geneva in September I 992, 
and the fifth a meeting which the Reis-ul-ulema of the Islamic Community Jakub Selimovski 
51Thomas Shanker, "Adventists getting the mail through," Philadelphia Inquirer, April30, 1993. 
Also, "Paketi za Sarajevo," [Parcels for Sarajevo], Evropske Novosti (Frankfurt), May 22, 1993. 
520ne such sound interpretation is that of Vjekoslav Bajsic. Interview with Bajsic, January 11, 
1993, in Zagreb. 
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also was able to be present at a meeting which was convened by the Conference of European 
Churches and the European Catholic Bishops' Conference in Switzerland in early 1993. 
The most powerful text emerged out of the Geneva meeting partially reproduced here as 
follows: 
Following our prayers and conversations, we appeal with one mind and voice 
to the faithful of our churches, to the responsible organs of the state, to military 
commandos and troops, to all peoples and men and women of our common 
geographical and spiritual area, as well as to all international forums and institutions 
engaged in the search for a solution or "in the provision of aid to our region and in 
our states; and we do not only appeal but demand, on the basis of our spiritual 
position and moral responsibility: 
1. Immediately and without condition to cease all hostilities, all bloodshed and all 
destruction, in particular to stop the blasphemous and insane destruction of places 
of prayer and holy places, Christian and Muslim alike; and that negotiations 
between the warring parties be initiated without delay. 
2. Immediately and without condition to liberate all prisoners of war and hostages, 
as well as to close all prison camps and to free all those incarcerated in this evil 
war. 
3. Immediately and without condition to cease the inhuman practice of ethnic 
cleansing, by whomever it is being incited or carried out. 
4. To permit all refugees and deportees to return to their homes and to ensure all 
bishops and priests of our churches as well as Islamic spiritual leaders free access 
to their flock and undisturbed exercise of their office. 
S. That normal communication and unrestricted circulation be re-established, as well 
as the possibility of free movement and settlement for all people, whatever their 
religious or national affiliation, and 
6 that all suffering people be assured undisturbed and equal access to humanitarian 
aid. 
Equally with one mind and voice we condemn all crimes and distance 
ourselves from all criminals, irrespective of which people or army they belong to or 
which church or religious affiliation they claim. We especially express our horror at 
the perpetration of extremely immoral misdeeds, at the mistreatment of older and 
younger women and girls, which only monsters can perpetrate, no matter what name 
they give themselves. 
Before God, before humanity and before our own conscience we pledge that 
we will use all evangelical means and the full influence of pur office and 
responsibility in church and society to work, in our· own states and peoples, decisively 
and openly for peace, justice and the salvation of each and every one, for the dignity 
and inalienable rights of every individual and every people, for humanity and 
tolerance, for forgiveness and love. 
We ourselves call, individually and together, for repentance before the God 
of love, for conversation and for service to him, that we can live anew as neighbours, 
friends and brothers, 
Peace to all!53 
Of great importance was the distancing which the prelates took from those who would wage 
war in the name of their religion, saying that to do so is the greatest crime against one's own 
religion. 
53See full text in OPREE, Vol. XII, No. 5 (October 1992), pp. S0-51. 
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The Christmas message 1992 by all the Orthodox bishops presided by Patriarch Paul I is 
likewise very peace oriented. 54 In it the Bishops give an answer why such destruction ensued 
after the proclamation of democracy and multi-party elections. The reason is "that the 
proclaimed principles were accepted only externally, f-ormally, but in the soul matters stayed 
unchanged due to espousing the notion that one can help oneself and one's people more by 
doing evil than by good, and that one can defend oneself and one's people from crimes and 
criminals by doing the same, namely by means of inhumanity and crimes ... "55 The bishops 
proceeded to point out that these attitudes brought about the unhappiness of all the nations 
involved in this war, and then they invoked love toward all as mark of Christian discipleship. 
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Belgrade, the Slovene France Perko, also rejected the 
linkage between war massacres and religion yet admitted that the coupling is now closer. 
While urging patriotism instead of nationalism the Archbishop conceded that many believers 
see themselves more as nationalists than Christians due to the deficiency of evangelization. 56 
Looking at the leadership in religious communities, it is difficult to find prelates with 
a distinct orientation toward peace. The top leadership of the three communities--Orthodox, 
Catholic, and Islamic--are more conciliatory than some of their colleagues, but no one 
emerged with a Christ-like, Ghandian or Martin Luther King, Jr.-type strategy of resisting 
evil. There are minuscule groups of dissenters who oppose the war or who look for alternate 
peaceful ways in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo.67 In Sarajevo, for instance, there was a 
small group of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim clergy led by Marko Orsolic, a Franciscan, 
who founded the International Center for Interreligious Dialogue, Justice, and Peace who are 
working toward converting one of the military barracks into a dialogue center after the war, 
but they are not only isolated but also despised by their own religious community. Some 
have already been assassinated by members of their own groups; Orsolic, a Croat, is being 
attacked in the Croatian press as a 'communist.'58 
54Unfortunately Herbst uses this document selectively and regards it as an escalation in episcopal 
and patriarchal defensiveness of the Serb position that they are waging merely a defensive war. See 
op.cit., p. 18. 
55Glasnik, Vol. 73, No. 12 (December 1992), pp. 198-199. Transl. from Serbian into English by 
Paul Mojzes. It should be noted that the text is not directed at enemies of the Serbs. 
56
"Krieg erst am Anfang," G2W, Vol. 21, No.2, 1993, p. 11. 
57In Zagreb Jerry Shenk, an American Mennonite theologian and activist tried to teach pacifism 
at the gathering of a group of religious people convened by the Fellowship of Reconciliation. 
68Interviews with Orsolic· during the first week in December 1992 in Baltimore and Rosemont, 
PA. 
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One of the American peace activists reports that most of the clergy, especially the higher 
clergy, in former Yugoslavia have been inundated by foreign ecumenical and fact-finding 
delegations, and they feel overburdened by high expectations that the churches can be agents 
of reconciliation while they do not se~ _themselves as having that much influence. The 
activist reports that it is fairly difficult to find key middle level or higher clergy who wish 
to meet with their opposites from other churches. The most that one can expect at the 
present moment is relief work by the churches, an effort for which they are neither trained 
nor particularly well suited. While some of the church centers seem to be able to effectively 
distribute relief based only on need, there are reports of abuses; certain local churches 
distribute aid only to regular church-goers of their own denomination or use aid to promote 
church attendance. 
C. Conclusion 
It is difficult to have hope regarding a better future for the devastated and brutalized 
people of ex-Yugoslavia, including the religious segment and its institutions. Most people 
with whom I spoke or corresponded expect it to become worse before it will become better. 
In Dante's "Inferno" there is a sign over hell: "Abandon hope all those who enter." The people 
in former Yugoslavia are, indeed, closer to hell than to heaven--at least regarding life here 
on earth. The most the religious communities are able to do is to suffer along. Perhaps some 
of them learn a lesson that stimulating national chauvinism and separatism rather than 
tolerance, pluralism, and concern for fellow-human beings regardless of nationality and 
religion is a recipe for hell. 
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